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Abstract
This paper presents an information-theoretic
model of a voting system, consisting of (a) defi-
nitions of the desirable qualities of integrity, pri-
vacy and verifiability, and (b) quantitative mea-
sures of how close a system is to being perfect
with respect to each of the qualities. It describes
the well-known trade-off between integrity and
privacy in this model, and defines a concept of
weak privacy, which is traded off with system
verifiability. This paper is a simultaneous sub-
mission to VSRW06 and WOTE06. Both Pro-
gram Committee Chairs are aware of the simul-
taneous submission and have approved it, as nei-
ther meeting will have printed proceedings.
1 Introduction
Elections in the United States have relied more
and more upon computerized or electronic voting
technology. Additionally, other democracies are
also using electronic voting – examples include
the UK’s early internet voting trial, and India’s
use of a single type of dedicated electronic polling
machine. Yet, the literature does not provide a
standard model to compare the electronic voting
systems with the electromechanical and paper-
based systems they have replaced, or to compare
them among themselves.
This paper presents a voting model that is based
∗These authors supported in part by NSF SGER
0505510
on information flow through an election system.
Some of the more important desirable properties
of voting systems – integrity, privacy and verifi-
ability – are carefully defined in the model, and
information theoretic metrics for the measure-
ment of deviation from perfect are presented.
The advantage of this model is (a) it provides
a single framework in which to define and mea-
sure integrity, privacy and verifiability, and (b)
the tradeoffs among these criteria are explicit in
this model. In fact, the tradeoffs among these
criteria arise exactly because all the information
required to verify and release vote counts can
only be obtained from the votes. This makes an
information-theoretic approach the natural – if
not the only – approach to study these.
We make some important points about our ap-
proach here. The measures we propose – for in-
tegrity, privacy, verifiability and usability – are
based on the concept of entropy. The type of en-
tropy – computational or information-theoretic
– can, in principle, depend on what is best for
the specific setting; the paper addresses, for
the purpose of simplicity of presentation, only
information-theoretic entropy. One may argue
about whether the exact measures proposed are
the best ones - that is, whether one uses an aver-
age or maximum entropy measure, whether one
examines the system separately for each individ-
ual, or aggregates across individuals. The main
focus of this paper, however, is not the exact
details of the measures (though these are, in our
opinion, the best of several alternatives), but the
model itself and the manner in which it exposes
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all the tradeoffs.
Our uniform approach while determining mea-
sures has been that, when a system treats a par-
ticular user or groups of users differently from
others, we are actually dealing with multiple sys-
tems, and each has its own measure. Hence, for
example, if a system leaks more information on
voters from location X than it does on voters
from location Y, there are at least two measures
of the system privacy: one for those voting in lo-
cation X, and another for those voting in location
Y. It is clear how this idea extends to, for exam-
ple usability: the usability measure for a particu-
lar system for the visually handicapped would, in
general, be different from that for those not visu-
ally handicapped. Thus, while an entropy-based
measure averages over randomly-obtained out-
puts, it need not average over populations that
are treated distinctly by the system.
This paper provides an initial attempt at for-
malizing the framework, and presents the types
of questions that can be examined using it.
2 Prior Work
[?] contains one of the earliest list of voting sys-
tem requirements, and many papers in the recent
WOTE 2001 [?] and WEST 2002 [?] workshops
also include overviews of voting system require-
ments [?, ?, ?]. None provide a means of mea-
suring performance with respect to the require-
ments. Papers on evaluating voting technologies
include [?, ?], and several other papers from the
NIST Workshop on Threats to Voting Systems
[?], in particular [?, ?], provide an evaluation
with respect to threats to count integrity. [?]
provides a mathematical definition of voting sys-
tem privacy, and a related entropy-based privacy
measure, which our work draws heavily from.
3 Election Goals
This section provides a brief list of desirable
properties of election systems; the goals have
been drawn from prior work such as [?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
1. Usability: Ballots should be “cast as in-
tended,” meaning that an otherwise valid
voter who intends to cast a vote for Candi-
date Alice should not be thwarted by elec-
tion procedures or technology.
2. Integrity: Ballots should be “counted
as cast,” meaning that the voting system
should declare that Candidate Bob received
m votes if and only if exactly m ballots
marked for Candidate Bob were cast.
3. Privacy: The secret ballot principle should
apply to the election; voter i should not have
the contents of her ballot associated with
her in any way by anyone – even with the
collusion of many parties, including election
officials and other voters. Notably, this pri-
vacy should be involuntary, in the sense that
even a set of colluding parties that includes
voter i herself should not be able to prove
the contents of her ballot once she has left
the polling place.
One may note that a system that provides
privacy also provides fairness [?]: partial
election results should not be available to
anyone during the election. (This require-
ment ensures that the election is fair to
all candidates, as the revelation of partial
counts might encourage supporters of a win-
ning candidate to abstain from voting when
they might have otherwise voted.) Fairness
is implied by privacy because the revelation
of partial vote counts reveals information
about individual votes.
4. Verifiability: Both the general public – in-
cluding non-voting observers – as well as the
individual voter should be able to rest as-
sured that the above goals have been met.
Such assurance should not require real-time
observation of election procedures or secret
information.
Dispute-freeness [?] is a special kind of
verifiability, where disputes raised by var-
ious parties as to the validity of the elec-
tion are decidable based on information
that is publicly-available. In other words,
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the dispute resolution procedure is publicly-
verifiable.
5. Robustness: Errors and failures can be de-
tected and fixed without impact upon the
other goals.
4 The Model
In this section we describe our model and trans-
late some of the goals of the previous section into
mathematical conditions in the model.
We will consider that there are n voters cast-
ing ballots in an election. Let Vi be a discrete
random variable representing voter i’s ballot (or
rather the votes it contains); Vi ∈ V, the set of all
possible ballots in the election. We will use V ∗ as
shorthand for [V1, V2, . . . Vn−1, Vn]; V ∗ ∈ Vn. Let
V Σ be the vote count, in the form: “In the race
for Governor, 600 votes for Alice, 400 for Bob;
on Proposition 242, 580 votes for Yes, 420 votes
for No, . . .” V Σ is therefore also a discrete ran-
dom variable, but it is a deterministic function
of V ∗.
Let V̂ Σ represent the vote count output by the
voting system used to conduct the election, and
let E be its entire “output”. From our point
of view, E will be some vector or set of dis-
crete random variables. (Note that V̂ Σ is a
part of E). Assume that the voting system
declares two algorithms, i.e. two sets of well-
defined steps, V oteCount and ElectionOutput,
that, when applied to the votes, V ∗, produce
V̂ Σ and E respectively. When V oteCount and
ElectionOutput are known, we represent V̂ Σ and
E by V oteCount(V ∗) and ElectionOutput(V ∗)
respectively. Note that this does not imply that
either of V oteCount and ElectionOutput is nec-
essarily deterministic, simply that V̂ Σ and E are
the outputs of the voting system after applying
a set of well-defined, known, steps to V ∗
4.1 Preliminaries
We use the notion of entropy to define the math-
ematical goals and to measure deviation from
perfect. As defined by Shannon [?], entropy is
a mathematical measure of the uncertainty in a
random variable. We concern ourselves only with
discrete random variables, and measure entropy
in bits. The entropy of discrete random variable
X that takes on value x with probability pX(x)
is
H(X) = −
∑
x
pX(x)log2pX(x)
Roughly speaking, the entropy of a random vari-
able is understood to be the average number of
bits required to represent it.
When two random variables X and Y are not
independent, knowing the value of one reduces
the uncertainty of the other. If H(X|Y ) is the
uncertainty in X if Y is known,
H(X|Y ) =
∑
y
pY (y)H(X|y)
The reduction in entropy in one variable, due to
the other being known, is termed mutual infor-
mation. It is defined as follows:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
and it can be shown that:
I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X)
The computational entropy of a random vari-
able, roughly speaking, is the average number of
bits required to represent it under the constraint
that the algorithm generating the bits from the
random variable is feasible in the computational
model [?]. In certain instances, when secrecy
is provided by computational assumptions, it is
more appropriate to use computational entropy
over “Shannon” (or absolute) entropy. We will
point out these instances when possible. While
the use of computational entropy in the defini-
tions is outside the scope of this paper, it appears
to be a straightforward extension of this work.
Further, the fact that we do not address compu-
tational entropy explicitly should not be taken
to imply that we require or recommend the use
of only Shannon entropy in all cases.
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4.2 Integrity
Election integrity requires that, if the voting sys-
tem follows its declared algorithm V oteCount,
there should not be any cast votes uncounted
or any uncast votes counted. In other words,
algorithm V oteCount, if followed, produces the
correct vote count, V Σ. Integrity does not ad-
dress the issue of whether V oteCount is indeed
followed by the voting system; this is covered by
the property of verifiability (see section 5).
Election integrity may be defined more precisely
as follows:
Definition 1: An election system provides
perfect integrity if V oteCount(V ∗) = V Σ.
Even if the system does not provide perfect
integrity, the uncertainty in V Σ is generally re-
duced on knowledge of V oteCount(V ∗). The re-
duction in uncertainty, I(V Σ;V oteCount(V ∗))
could range anywhere from zero (indicating
election results independent of the cast ballots,
and hence an election with zero integrity) up
to a maximum of H(V Σ) (indicating perfect
integrity). One could use a normalized value of
this reduction in uncertainty to measure election
integrity.
Definition 2: The integrity measure of an elec-
tion system is
I =
I(V Σ;V oteCount(V ∗))
H(V Σ)
We assume that the system treats all voters
similarly (if not, then there are really two
election systems).
Example 1: Consider a voting system that
produces a vote count through hand counting,
where V oteCount produces the average of N
hand counts. The hand counts are not necessar-
ily observed by the public, but, assuming that
the algorithm is as declared, the uncertainty in
V Σ is the uncertainty due to hand counting.
The integrity is not perfect, and the integrity
measure increases with N . Whether the system
actually does count the votes is addressed
through the property of verifiability, see section
5.
We assume, wlog, that an integrity value of
one implies perfect integrity – that is, that
V oteCount(V ∗) does not produce a value f(V Σ)
for f a deterministic invertible function that is
not the identity. (If it did, the claimed vote count
would be incorrect, but it would contain all the
information necessary to obtain the correct vote
count, which can be obtained by applying the
inverse of f to V oteCount(V ∗). Note that this
is true whether the measure used is “Shannon
entropy” or computational entropy, because a
computational integrity of one means that V Σ
can be determined from V oteCount(V ∗) in the
computational model).
4.3 Privacy
Election privacy is the property that the election
system should not reveal information about the
values of individual or specific votes. Perfect
privacy can be defined as in [?]. We state
the definition almost verbatim here, except
we ignore any vote information obtained from
outside the system, and use the fact that
E = ElectionOutput(V ∗); that is, the pri-
vacy definition assumes that the relationship
between the output of the voting system and
the individual votes is known. This makes for
a stronger privacy requirement, and a weaker
one, where E is assumed to not necessarily be
ElectionOutput(V ∗), is covered in section 5.3.4.
Note that ElectionOutput is not restricted to
V oteCount, it includes any other information
the system may reveal.
Definition 3 [?]: An election system pro-
vides perfect privacy if V ∗ is independent of
ElectionOutput(V ∗), i.e.,
pV ∗(v∗) = pV ∗|ElectionOutput(V ∗)(v∗;ElectionOutput(v∗))
for all v∗, ElectionOutput(v∗).
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The measure of [?] is an appropriate measure of
privacy loss, and we restate it here in normalized
form.
Definition 4: The amount of privacy loss, L,
of a voting system and process is
L = maxpV ∗
I(V ∗;ElectionOutput(V ∗))
H(V ∗)
where pElectionOutput(V ∗)|V ∗ is held fixed (it
represents the system) and pV ∗ varies.
L ranges between zero (indicating that the
election system reveals nothing at all about any
ballots) and one (indicating that the election
system reveals all ballots exactly), when the
algorithm relating E to ElectionOutput(V ∗)
is known. We do not distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary privacy, but this
distinction exists in the literature, in particular
in [?] from which our definition is drawn.
Example 2: Consider a precinct with a single
polling machine that provides VVPAT records
on a paper reel which maintains the order of
the vote. Suppose further that election officials
maintain a record of who voted, in the order of
arrival. Trivially, E consists of the ordered list
of votes, and the ordered list of voters. Hence
H(V ∗|E) = 0, and the privacy loss of this sys-
tem is one.
4.4 Integrity/Privacy Relationship
The goals of integrity and privacy are not inde-
pendent, and, furthermore, the literature states
that perfect privacy and perfect integrity are not
simultaneously achievable; see, for example, [?].
Example 3: Consider the fraudulent election:
Candidate Alice is declared the winner indepen-
dent of the votes. The integrity of the election
is zero, and the privacy perfect, because the
election output reveals no information at all
about the vote.
Because perfect integrity is incompatible with
perfect privacy except for the most trivial elec-
tion, any election system must make tradeoffs
between the two. As the purpose of the election
is to obtain the vote count, the approach in the
literature has been to require perfect integrity
and the maximum privacy given that integrity is
perfect.
Let us consider the case where perfect integrity is
achieved; in other words, V oteCount(V ∗) = V Σ.
The system that provides the most privacy while
achieving perfect integrity, provides no more
information about V ∗ other than V Σ.
Definition 5: An election system is said to pro-
vide maximal privacy if V ∗ is conditionally
independent of ElectionOutput(V ∗) after condi-
tioning on V Σ, i.e.,
pV ∗|V Σ(v
∗; vΣ) = pV ∗|V Σ,ElectionOutput(V ∗)(v
∗; vΣ, ElectionOutput(v∗))
for all v∗, vΣ, ElectionOutput(v∗).
5 Verifiable Elections
So far, we have assumed a model of perfect trust
in the voting system, that is, we have assumed
that the algorithm V oteCount of the voting sys-
tem is known. We have not discussed, however,
how we know that the voting system is actually
following algorithm V oteCount, that is, we have
not studied the verification requirements of the
system. This section addresses verification.
Consider E as being divided into two elements:
1. V̂ Σ, a purported vote count.
2. P , information that can be used to prove
V̂ Σ = V oteCount(V ∗), that is, information
that is used to prove that the claimed algo-
rithm, V oteCount, was followed.
5.1 The Definition of Verifiability
Perfect verifiability occurs when there is no
uncertainty whether the election system used
V oteCount to produce V̂ Σ, given the correctness
proof provided by the system. We denote by T
the random variable representing the truth of
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V oteCount(V ∗) = V̂ Σ.
Definition 6: An election system is perfectly
verifiable when H(T |P ) = 0.
Equivalently, I(T ;P ) = H(T ). Note that an
election system may be perfectly verifiable even
if the proof shows that the vote count was not
obtained through its declared algorithm; we
simply require that a system provide enough
information to check its result.
Definition 7: The verifiability measure of an
election system is
V = minpV ∗
I(T ;P )
H(T )
Notice that we do not define verifiability as a
measure of the uncertainty in V Σ = V̂ Σ; that
is, we do not define it in terms of how close
the purported vote count is to the true one.
Such a definition would be a combination of
our definition of verifiability (which connects
the purported vote count to that achieved by
the declared algorithm) and our definition of
integrity (which connects the output of the
declared algorithm to the correct vote count).
For verifiability, we simply require the system to
demonstrate that it is indeed using the declared
algorithm, which was quantified by its integrity
measure. In other words, we are not requiring
that the election channel introduce no noise
at all, but that it introduces no more noise
than does the declared algorithm V oteCount;
if Z represents the noise introduced in V̂ Σ by
V oteCount, then T represents the truth of
V̂ Σ − V Σ = Z.
Example 4: Consider an election system that
makes the following common “black box” DRE
claim:
• During polling, V ∗ (and nothing else) goes
in.
• After polling, V Σ (and nothing else) comes
out.
Figure 1: Winner Verifiability vs Audit Size for
various Margins of Victory
Here, V oteCount(V ∗) = V Σ, and the integrity
is perfect. However, E = V̂ Σ; that is, P = ∅.
Hence, H(T |P ) = H(T ) and V = 0.
5.2 A Special Case: First-Past-The-
Post Elections
The above definition of verifiability is appropri-
ate for use in elections where the exact vote tally
is of interest, such as a legislative election in-
volving proportional representation. However,
we are often concerned only with the identity
of the winning candidate, not with the margin
of victory. (This is the case in “first-past-the-
post” elections, including almost all elections in
the US.) In such elections a weaker definition of
verifiability can apply. We denote byW the ran-
dom variable representing the truth of the sen-
tence “The correct winner was declared in this
election.” (Note that by “correct winner”, we
mean the winner according to V oteCount(V ∗).)
The probability thatW is true (meaning the cor-
rect winner was declared) is a function of the
margin of victory in the election. In the case of
an election system that uses randomized partial
audits this is:
PrW (∆) =
∆∑
F=0
Pr(F ) +
N∑
F=∆
PD(N,F, T )Pr(F )
where ∆ is the margin of victory, PD(N,F, T ) is
Neff’s probability of catching fraud, and Pr(F )
is the probability of fraud level F (that is, the
probability that F ballots were modified). The
Winner Verifiability (W) of the election is
then the entropy ofW , and is likewise a function
of the margin of victory, as well as the probabil-
ity distribution of F . Figure 1 on page 7 plotsW
as a function of the audit size for various values
of ∆, given that F is 0 with probability 12 and
∆
2
with probability 12 .
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5.3 Means of Verification
There are several means used to obtain verifica-
tion that the system uses the declared algorithm,
V oteCount.
5.3.1 Institutional Trust
In practice, the voter probably has some non-
trivial amount of trust in the Election Author-
ity, unless she actively believes in a conspiracy
to falsify elections. We categorize this as Insti-
tutional Trust, the “baseline” willingness of an
observer to believe T is True. We do not, how-
ever, use this reduction in uncertainty, obtained
without a provision of proof, as a contribution
to the system’s verifiability. This reduction in
uncertainty is not caused by the specific election
system or procedures, but by the voters’ will-
ingness to trust the system, obtained, perhaps,
from other interactions with related authorities
and systems– for example, the government, and
the authentication system of the Department of
Motor Vehicles. If Institutional Trust is used in
any way to characterize verifiability, it would in-
fluence the denominator in the definition of the
verifiability measure, by determining the prior
probability distribution on T ; for example, per-
haps pT (t) = 0.8 when t = true.
5.3.2 System Trust
P may consist of information about the election
system itself, such as physical security proce-
dures, source code, circuit diagrams, and / or
parallel audit procedures and results. This sort
of information is information about the type of
election being run. For example, if the election
is being run on a Brand X Voting Machine, P
would include information about the general re-
liability of Brand X Voting Machines; if parallel
audits are being run, P could include informa-
tion about the set of Brand X Voting Machines
delivered to the Election Authority. Information
about the election system itself is not, however,
information about the specific voting machine
or election in question
Information about the election system serves to
reduce H(T ) for a specific set of voting ma-
chine(s) used in the election in the following
way. Let t be the value of T for the specific
set of machines for the election, i.e. t = (v̂Σ =
V oteCount(v∗)). Any testing of the voting ma-
chine(s) before election day, and any testing of
similar machines on election day or at another
time, involves determining the values of Y , a
similar, random variable, related to T . That
is, Y = (V̂ Σ = V oteCount(V ∗)) for the same
machine(s) on another day, or for similar ma-
chine(s) on the same/another day. Repeatedly
sampling the value of Y , say N times, enables
the statistical characterization of the distribu-
tion of Y . That is, it enables an estimation of
the probability with which the machines tested
are using V oteCount at the time they are tested.
The larger the value of N , the lower the uncer-
tainty in the estimation of the probability dis-
tribution of Y . If the machines are always us-
ing V oteCount, the value of Y will always be
true, however, the uncertainty in Y is zero only
asymptotically.
Clearly, H(Y )→ 0 does not imply H(T )→ 0; in
fact,
lim
N→0
H(Y ) = 0⇒ lim
N→0
H(T ) = H(T |Y )
When the only proofs provided are those of
the statistical behavior of similar systems, the
asymptotic value of the verifiability is
lim
N→0
V = minpV ∗
I(T ;Y )
H(T )
It can be increased by improving the testing
and more tightly coupling the tested systems to
those used on election day, that is, by increasing
I(T ;Y ).
5.3.3 Audit Trail
Even if every single audit or test ever conducted
using the election system in question has indi-
cated that the system is trustworthy, there will
still remain some uncertainty about whether the
specific election under consideration has been
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compromised or was erroneous, because how
can one ever know that the next election will be
the one to be compromised? Information about
the actual, specific election under examination
can be included in P . We will name the portion
of P that contains information about V ∗ (even
indirect information such as bits of random
number seeds, cryptographic keys, etc., that
have no significant impact on computational
security but do impact the information-theoretic
privacy of V ∗) the Audit Trail.
5.3.4 Weak Privacy
We define the weak privacy of a system as the
privacy provided when E is a random variable
that is not necessarily ElectionOutput(V ∗);
the amount of privacy then depends on the
uncertainty in E.
Definition 8 (this is identical to the definition in
[?]: An election system provides weak privacy
if V ∗ is independent of E, i.e.,
pV ∗(v∗) = pV ∗|E(v∗; e)
for all v∗, e.
The corresponding normalized measure is:
Definition 9: The amount of weak privacy
loss, Lw, of a voting system and process is
Lw = maxpV ∗
I(V ∗;E)
H(V ∗)
where pE|V ∗ is held fixed (it represents the
system).
Like L, Lw ranges between zero (indicating that
the election system reveals nothing at all about
any ballots) and one (indicating that the election
system reveals all ballots exactly). However, it
is typically smaller than L because the output of
the election system, E, is not necessarily proven
to be ElectionOutput, hence its values contain
more uncertainty than when it was assumed to
be exactly ElectionOutput.
5.3.5 Completeness
No information other than System Trust infor-
mation and Audit Trail information can reduce
the uncertainty in T . This is because System
Trust is information about the distribution of
random variable T , and the Audit Trail is in-
formation about the specific value of this vari-
able, t = (v̂Σ = V oteCount(v∗)), which depends
only on the known value v̂Σ, the known algo-
rithm V oteCount, and the value v∗.
5.3.6 Parallel Testing/System Trust and
Audit Trails
Example 5 demonstrates that a finite amount of
information about the specific election, H(V ∗),
can lead to perfect verifiability. On the other
hand, an infinite number of parallel audit style
tests are required to achieve that result. Further,
assuming that every ballot counts equally, every
bit (for example) of information about V ∗ con-
tains the same amount of information about V Σ;
that is, a single bit of information about V ∗ re-
duces H(V Σ) by the same amount. On the other
hand, every parallel test used to characterize the
statistical behavior of the voting system reduces
H(X) by a smaller amount than did the previ-
ous one. Thus parallel testing provides a more
inefficient way of obtaining the same amount of
verifiability.
On the other hand, parallel testing does not ob-
tain its information from V ∗, hence it does not
reduce privacy. System Trust/parallel audit in-
formation is information about the distribution
of (supposedly) identical systems under similar
conditions (including, importantly, different in-
put). It does not include any information about
V ∗ or any Vi. Audit Trail information is directly
opposed to privacy by definition, since it is in-
formation about V ∗.
5.4 Usability
In this section, we illustrate how our model may
be used to examine usability. Not being us-
ability experts, we are not able to characterize
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completely and in detail, the usability measures
themselves. We present this material here to
illustrate that the information-theoretic model
does not need to be restricted to the understand-
ing of integrity, privacy and verifiability.
Consider the perfect vote for voter i – the
vote she intends to cast, Vi. Consider the vote
recorded by the user interface, random variable
V ′i . For various reasons – a bad ballot design,
a user interface inaccessible to a person of her
abilities, etc. – V ′i may not be identical to Vi.
Unless the usability of the system is the worst
possible, however, V ′i will not be independent
of Vi. The dependence on Vi will be a function
of the categories the voter falls in: perhaps
the user interface is more difficult to use for a
person with visual handicaps than it is for one
without; perhaps it is more difficult to use for
a person whose native tongue is not English.
Thus the user interface may be characterized
as a communication channel carrying the input
Vi from the voter to provide the output V ′i
as seen by the polling machine. pV ′i |Vi(v
′
i; vi)
characterizes the communication channel, and
perfect usability occurs when V ′i = Vi with
probability one for all values of i.
Definition 10: A user interface provides perfect
usability when Pr[V ′i = Vi] = 1 ∀ i .
When this is not so, the usability of the interface
is the ratio of the information in V ′i about Vi, to
the information in Vi.
Definition 11: The usability measure of the
interface for voter i is
U =
I(V ′i ;Vi)
H(Vi)
Note that U = 1 does not imply perfect usabil-
ity, it simply implies that V ′i contains all the in-
formation necessary to determine Vi. One can
imagine a voting system that obtains all the in-
formation necessary to determine Vi but does not
attempt to to determine it. In other words, us-
ability does not necessarily imply that ballots,
once properly cast as intended will be properly
recorded as cast. Whether these are recorded as
cast or not is examined while measuring verifia-
bility. We do not address the issue of usability
further, and assume perfect usability in the rest
of this paper, that is, Vi = V ′i .
6 Open Questions In This
Model
In this section, we present some questions that
this model will allow us to address in future re-
search, along with some speculation about the
results.
6.1 Verifiability and Privacy
We have described the tradeoffs that exist be-
tween integrity and privacy. In addition, we have
noted that tradeoffs must exist between Audit
Trail verifiability and privacy (because that form
of verifiability necessarily includes information
about V ∗ beyond the information in V̂ Σ. On the
other hand, System Trust verifiability does not
impact privacy (except indirectly, by decreasing
the uncertainty that V̂ Σ = V Σ) because it re-
veals no information about the actual election in
question.
We note a fundamental difference between Sys-
tem Trust and Audit Trail verifiability. Sys-
tem Trust verifiability draws elections to au-
dit from an infinite-size population of “poten-
tial elections” that could be performed with the
election system in question. As more and more
such audits are performed, the probability that
an unfair or otherwise incorrect election exists in
that population asymptotically approaches zero.
However, when using System Trust information
to verify a specific election, one must consider
the chance that the election system “knows” (via
some secret signal or switch) the difference be-
tween an audit and a “live” election. In other
words, System Trust verifiability does not ad-
dress the possibility that the population of au-
ditable elections is not the same as the popula-
tion of “live” elections. Thus, the uncertainty
in the correctness of a specific “live” election
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can only be reduced asymptotically to a non-
zero value τ . On the other hand, Audit Trail
verifiability can reduce that uncertainty to zero,
but the only example we have demonstrated that
does so is one that totally sacrifices privacy and
reveals all the votes.
It seems to us that by combining System Trust
verifiability with Audit Trail verifiability, we can
achieve better verifiability and privacy for a spe-
cific live election than by using either alone. We
speculate that one could use System Trust verifi-
ability (i.e.: parallel audits) to reduce the uncer-
tainty in the correctness of the election to some
distance from τ , and also use Audit Trail verifi-
ability (in effect) to reduce τ by some amount.
In other words, one could use Audit Trail veri-
fiability to “spend” a certain amount of privacy
to get a certain amount of verifiability, and then
(possibly) use System Trust verifiability to aug-
ment that. However, it is not yet clear to what
extent the two forms of verifiability actually can
complement each other.
6.2 Cast As Intended, Recorded as
Cast, and Counted as Recorded
We have described the difference between vol-
untary privacy and involuntary privacy, but we
have only scratched the surface of the differences
between these two concepts in our model. Sim-
ilarly, we have not drawn a clear distinction be-
tween voter verifiability and public verifiability.
To examine these differences in more detail we
must focus on other stages of the election pro-
cess than the “counted as recorded”1 stage.
It appears to us that there are actually three
channels involved in an election system: the
“cast as intended” channel that converts voter
intentions to cast ballots, the “recorded as in-
tended” channel that converts those cast bal-
lots into recorded ballots, and the “counted as
cast” channel that converts those recorded bal-
lots into a vote count. This paper has focused
on the “counted as cast” channel. We speculate
that the other two channels are easily added to
1We first heard these terms used by Alan Sherman in
a lecture.
our model, and will have similar properties of
throughput and verifiability versus privacy.
In addition, we note that the above division into
three stages is natural in that it is according to
the type of verifiability that is possible in each
one. Only the voter can verify that her inten-
tions were accurately written on the ballot to be
cast; the “cast as intended” stage is inherently
not publicly verifiable. Similarly, in order to ver-
ify that the cast ballots were correctly recorded,
(or to raise an objection that some set of cast
ballots were not correctly recorded), some voters
must reveal some form of receipt or other infor-
mation about their cast ballots, impacting their
privacy. Thus, we speculate that public verifi-
ability of the “recorded as cast” stage requires
some “expenditure” of voluntary (information-
theoretic) privacy, and is not possible if all voters
refuse to cooperate. However, voter verifiability
of this stage (as well as of the “cast as intended”
stage) apparently does not impact privacy. Since
we have focused on the “counted as recorded”
stage in this paper, we have been unable to dif-
ferentiate between voter verifiability and public
verifiability (because these are essentially iden-
tical for this stage) and between voluntary and
involuntary privacy. Future examinations of the
first two channels should provide more insight
into these differences.
6.3 Contextual Information
In this paper, we have supposed that elections
occur in a vacuum, in the sense that the only
source of information about voters and their
votes is the election results. Of course, this is
not true. A voter’s demographic information and
other political behaviors and activity (such as
political party affiliation or PAC donations) that
would be available publicly (or otherwise) might
well reduce an observer’s uncertainty about that
voter’s (intended) vote. Accordingly, the act of
actually voting, and making information about
that vote available in the election results, would
have a less severe effect on that voter’s privacy
than it would in the “vacuum” election. Thus,
a system that leaks more information might be
10
acceptable when such contextual information is
taken into account than otherwise.
Future research into this model will provide more
insight into this issue. We speculate that almost
all the terms in the existing equations will simply
become dependent or conditional on the contex-
tual information, and that this might easily be
represented through a different initial probabil-
ity distribution (prior distribution) on the votes,
V ∗. The interesting question here is the extent to
which various measures are affected by the con-
textual information; the conditioning on such in-
formation is likely to affect the normalizing terms
of the integrity, privacy, and verifiability metrics
(for example) quite differently.
7 Conclusions
We have presented the beginnings of an
information-theoretic approach to rating voting
systems for integrity, privacy and verifiability.
We have used this framework to show that trade-
offs exist between integrity and privacy and be-
tween verifiability and privacy, and the propose
a few directions of future research.
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